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The Case of Belgium 



By \ 

James Mv Beck, LL.D. 

Late Assistant Attorney-General of the U. S. 



Reprinted from " The Evidence in the Case" by James M. Beck 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York and London 



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Copyright, 3914 

BY 

JAMES M. BECK 



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The Case of Belgium 



CHAPTER IX 

THE CASE OF BELGIUM 

The callous disregard by Germany of the rights 
of Belgium is one of the most shocking exhibitions 
of political iniquity in the history of the world. 

That it has had its parallel in other and less 
civilized ages may be freely admitted, but until 
German scientists, philosophers, educators, and 
even doctors of divinity attempted to justify this 
wanton outrage, it had been hoped that mankind 
had made some progress since the times of 
Wallenstein and Tilly. 

The verdict of Civilization in this respect will be 
little affected by the ultimate result of the war, for 
even if Germany should emerge from this titanic 
conflict as victor, and become, as it would then 
undoubtedly become, the first power in the world, 
it would none the less be a figure for the "time 
of scorn to point its slow unmoving finger at." 
To the eulogists of Alexander the Great, Seneca 
was wont to say, "Yes, but he murdered Callis- 
thenes," and to the eulogists of victorious Ger- 

190 



The Case of Belgium 191 

many, if indeed it shall prove victorious, the wise 
and just of all future ages will say, " Yes, but it 
devastated Belgium." 

The fact that many distinguished and un- 
doubtedly sincere partisans of Germany have 
attempted to justify this atrocious rape, suggests 
a problem of psychology rather than of logic 
or ethics. It strongly illustrates a too familiar 
phenomenon that great intellectual and moral 
astigmatism is generally incident to any passion- 
ate crisis in human history. It shows how pitifully 
unstable the human intellect is when a great man 
like Dr. Haeckel, a scholar and historian like Dr. 
von Mach, or a doctor of divinity like Dr. Dry- 
ander, can be so warped with the passions of the 
hour as to ignore the clearest considerations of 
political morality. 

At the outbreak of the present war Belgium had 
taken no part whatever in the controversy and 
was apparently on friendly relations with all the 
Powers. It had no interest whatever in the Servian 
question. A thrifty, prosperous people, inhabit- 
ing the most densely populated country of Europe, 
and resting secure in the solemn promises, not 
merely of Germany, but of the leading European 
nations that its neutrality should be respected, it 
calmly pursued the even tenor of its way, and 



192 The Evidence in the Case 

was as unmindful of the disaster, which was so 
suddenly to befall it, as the people of Pompeii 
were on the morning of the great eruption when 
they thronged the theatre in the pursuit of plea- 
sure and disregarded the ominous curling of the 
smoke from the crater of Vesuvius. 

On April 19, 1839, Belgium and Holland signed 
a treaty which provided that ''Belgium forms an 
independent state of perpetual neutrality." To 
insure that neutrality, Prussia, France, Great 
Britain, Austria, and Russia on the same date 
signed a treaty, by which it was provided that 
these nations jointly "became the guarantors" of 
such "perpetual neutrality." 

In his recent article on the war, George 
Bernard Shaw, who is inimitable as a farceur but 
not quite convincing as a jurist, says: 

As all treaties are valid only rebus sic stantibus, 
and the state of things which existed at the date of 
the Treaty of London (1839) had changed so much 
since then . . . that in 1870 Gladstone could not 
depend on it, and resorted to a special temporary 
treaty not now in force, the technical validity of the 
1839 treaty is extremely doubtful. 

Unfortunately for this contention, the Treaty 
of 1870, to which Mr. Shaw refers, provided for 



The Case of Belgium 193 

its own expiration after twelve months and then 
added : 

And on the expiration of that time the indepen- 
dence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the 
high contracting parties are respectively concerned, 
continue to rest as heretofore on the 1st Article of 
the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839. 

Much has been made by Mr. Shaw and others 
of an excerpt from a speech of Mr. Gladstone in 
1870. In that speech, Mr. Gladstone, as an 
abstract proposition, declined to accept the broad 
statement that under all circumstances the obliga- 
tions of a treaty might continue, but there is noth- 
ing to justify the belief that Mr. Gladstone in any 
respect questioned either the value or the validity 
of the Treaty of 1839 with respect to Belgium. 

Those who invoke the authority of Gladstone 
should remember that he also said : 

We have an interest in the independence of 
Belgium which is wider than that which we may 
have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It 
is found in the answer to the question whether, 
under the circumstances of the case, this country, 
endowed as it is with influence and power, would 
quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of 
the direst crime that ever stained the pages of 
history, and thus become participators in the sin. 



194 The Evidence in the Case 

These words of the great statesman read as a 
prophecy. 

While these treaties were simply declaratory of 
the rights, which Belgium independently enjoyed 
as a sovereign nation, yet this solemn guarantee 
of the great Powers of Europe was so effective that 
even in 1870, when France and Germany were 
locked in vital conflict, and the question arose 
whether Prussia would disregard her treaty obliga- 
tion, the Iron Chancellor, who ordinarily did not 
permit moral considerations to warp his political 
policies, wrote to the Belgian minister in Berlin 
on July 22, 1870: 

In confirmation of my verbal assurance, I have 
the honor to give in writing a declaration, which, in 
view of the treaties in force, is quite superfluous, 
that the Confederation of the North and its allies 
(Germany) will respect the neutrality of Belgium 
on the understanding of course that it is respected 
by the other belligerent. 

At that time, Belgium had so fine a sense of 
honor, that although it was not inconsistent with 
the principles of international law, yet in order to 
discharge her obligations of neutrality in the spirit 
as well as the letter, she restricted the clear legal 
right of her people to supply arms and ammunition 



The Case of Belgium 195 

to the combatants, thus construing the treaty to 
her own disadvantage. 

It can be added to the credit of both France and 
Prussia that in their great struggle of 1870-71, 
each scrupulously respected that neutrality, and 
France carried out her obligations to such an 
extreme that although Napoleon and his army 
could have at one time escaped from Sedan into 
Belgium, and renewed the attack and possibly — ■ 
although not probably — saved France, if they had 
seen fit to violate that neutrality, rather than 
break the word of France the Emperor Napoleon 
and his army consented to the crowning humiliation 
of Sedan. 

In the year 191 1, in the course of a discussion in 
Belgium in respect to the fortifications at Flush- 
ing, certain Dutch newspapers asserted that in the 
event of a Franco- German war, the neutrality of 
Belgium would be violated by Germany. It was 
then suggested that if a declaration were made to 
the contrary in the Reichstag, that such a decla- 
ration, "would be calculated to appease public 
opinion and to calm its suspicions." 

This situation was communicated to the present 
German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, who 
instructed the German Ambassador at Brussels to 
assure the Belgian Foreign Minister, 



196 The Evidence in the Case 

that he was most appreciative of the sentiment 
which had inspired our [Belgium's] action. He 
declared that Germany had no intention of violating 
our neutrality, but he considered that by making a 
declaration publicly, Germany would weaken her 
military preparation with respect to France, and 
being reassured in the northern quarter would 
direct her forces to the eastern quarter. 1 

Germany's recognition of the continuing obliga- 
tion of this treaty was also shown when the ques- 
tion of Belgium's neutrality was suggested at a 
debate in the Reichstag on April 29, 19 13. In the 
course of that debate a member of the Social 
Democratic Party said : 

In Belgium the approach of a Franco-German war 
is viewed with apprehension, because it is feared 
that Germany will not respect Belgian neutrality. 2 

Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, replied: "The neutrality of Belgium is 
determined by international conventions, and 
Germany is resolved to respect these conventions." 

This declaration did not satisfy another member 
of the Social Democratic Party. Herr von Jagow 
observed that he had nothing to add to the clear 
statement which he had uttered with reference to 
the relations between Germany and Belgium. 

In reply to further interrogations from a member 
of the Social Democratic Party, Herr von Heeringen, 

1 Belgian Gray Book, enclosure No. 12. 

2 Idem. 



The Case of Belgium 197 

Minister of War, stated: "Belgium does not play 
any part in the justification of the German scheme 
of military reorganization; the scheme is justified 
by the position of matters in the East. Germany 
will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality 
is guaranteed by international treaties." 

A member of the same party, having again referred 
to Belgium, Herr von Jagow again pointed out that 
his declaration regarding Belgium was sufficiently 
clear. x 

On July 31, 1 914, the Belgian Foreign Minister, 
in a conversation with Herr von Below, the Ger- 
man Minister at Brussels, asked him whether he 
knew of the assurance which, as above stated, had 
been given by Von Bethmann-Hollweg through 
the German Ambassador at Brussels to the Govern- 
ment at Belgium in 191 1, and Herr von Below 
replied that he did, and added, "that he was 
certain that the sentiments to which expression 
was given at that time had not changed." 

Thus on July 31, 1914, Germany, through its 
accredited representative at Brussels, repeated the 
assurances contained in the treaty of 1839, as 
reaffirmed in 1870, and again reaffirmed in 191 1 
and 1913. 

Germany's moral obligation had an additional 
express confirmation. 

1 Belgian Gray Book, No. 12. 



198 The Evidence in the Case 

The second International Peace Conference was 
held at The Hague in 1907. There were present 
the representatives of forty-four nations, thus mak- 
ing as near an approach to the poet's dream of the 
"federation of the world" and the "parliament of 
man" as has yet been possible in the slow progress 
of mankind. 

That convention agreed upon a certain declara- 
tion of principles, and among the signatures 
appended to the document was the representative 
of His Majesty, the German Emperor. 

They agreed upon certain principles of interna- 
tional morality, most of them simply declaratory 
of the uncodified international law then existing, 
and these were subsequently ratified by formal 
treaties of the respective governments, including 
Germany, which were deposited in the archives of 
The Hague. While this treaty as an express 
covenant was not binding, unless all belligerents 
signed it, yet, it recognized an existing moral ob- 
ligation. The Hague Peace Conference proceeded 
to define the rights of neutral powers, and in so 
doing simply reaffirmed the existing international 
law. 

The pertinent parts of this great compact, with 
reference to the sanctity of neutral territory, are as 
follows: 



The Case of Belgium 199 

• CONVENTION V 

CHAPTER I.— "THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF 
NEUTRAL POWERS 

ARTICLE I. 

The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable. 

ARTICLE II. 

Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of 
either munitions of war or supplies across the territory 
of a neutral Power. 

ARTICLE X. 

The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, 
attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as 
a hostile act. 

Notwithstanding these assurances, it had been 
from time to time intimated by German military 
writers, and notably by Bernhardi, that Germany 
would, in the event of a future war, make a quick 
and possibly a fatal blow at the heart of France 
by invading Belgium upon the first declaration of 
hostilities, and it was probably these intimations 
that led the Belgian Government on July 24, 1914, 
to consider: 

Whether in the existing circumstances, it would 
not be proper to address to the Powers, who had 
guaranteed Belgium's independence and its neutral- 
ity, a communication for the purpose of confirming 
to them its resolution to carry out the international 



200 The Evidence in the Case 

duties which are imposed upon it by treaties in the 
event of war breaking out on the Belgian frontiers. 

Confiding in the good faith of France and Ger- 
many, the Belgian Government concluded that 
any such declaration was premature. 

On August 2, 1914, the war having already 
broken out, the Belgian Foreign Minister took oc- 
casion to tell the German Ambassador that France 
had reaffirmed its intention to respect the neu- 
trality of Belgium, and Herr von Below, the 
German Ambassador, after thanking Davignon 
for his information, added that up to the present 
he had not been 

instructed to make us any official communication, 
but we were aware of his personal opinion respecting 
the security with which we had the right to regard 
our eastern neighbors. I [Davignon] replied at 
once that all we knew of the intentions of the latter, 
intentions set forth in many former interviews, did 
not allow us to doubt their [Germany's] perfectly 
correct attitude toward Belgium. 

It thus appears that as late as August 2, 1914, 
Germany had not given to Belgium any intimation 
as to its intention, and, what is more important, it 
had not either on that day or previously made any 
charge that Belgium had in any way violated its 
obligations of neutrality, or that France had committed 
any overt act in violation thereof. 



The Case of Belgium 201 

On July 31, 1 914, England, not unreasonably 
apprehensive as to the sincerity of Germany's oft- 
repeated protestations of good faith, directed the 
English Ambassadors at Paris and Berlin to ask 
the respective governments of those countries 
"whether each is prepared to respect the neu- 
trality of Belgium, provided it is violated by no 
other Power." 

This question was communicated by Sir Edward 
Grey to the Belgian Government, with the addition 
that he (Sir Edward Grey) asked that "the 
Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost 
of her power her neutrality which I desire, and 
expect other Powers to uphold and observe." 

Pursuant to these instructions, the English 
Ambassador to Paris, on the night of July 31, 1914, 
called upon Viviani, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and on the same night received a reply which is 
reported by Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, as 
follows : 

French Government is resolved to respect the 
neutrality of Belgium, and it would be only in the 
event of some other Power violating that neutrality 
that France might find herself under the necessity, 
in order to assure defense of her own security, to act 
otherwise. This assurance has been given several 
times. The President of the Republic spoke of it 
to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister 



2o2 The Evidence in the Case 

to Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assur- 
ance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
to-day. z 

Confirming this, the French Minister at Brussels, 
on August ist, made to the Belgian Foreign Minis- 
ter the following declaration : 

I am authorized to declare that in the event of 
an international conflict, the government of the 
Republic will, as it has always declared, respect 
the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neu- 
trality not being respected by another Power, the 
French Government, in order to insure its own 
defense, might be led to modify its attitude. 2 

On July 31, 1914, the English Ambassador at 
Berlin saw the German Secretary of State, and 
submitted Sir Edward Grey's pointed interroga- 
tion, and the only reply that was given was that 
" he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor 
before he could possibly answer, " and the German 
Secretary of State very significantly added that 
for strategic reasons it was "very doubtful whether 
they would return any answer at all." 

Goschen also submitted the matter to the Ger- 
man Chancellor, who also evaded the question by 
stating that "Germany would in any case desire 

1 English White Paper, No. 125. 
* Belgian Gray Paper, No. 15. 



The Case of Belgium 203 

to know the reply returned to you [the English 
Ambassador] by the French Government." 

That these were mere evasions the events on the 
following day demonstrated. 

On August 1st, Sir Edward Grey saw the German 
Ambassador in London, and the following signifi- 
cant conversation took place: 

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the 
reply of the German Government with regard to 
the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very 
great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium 
affected feeling in this country. If Germany 
could see her way to give the same assurance as 
that which had been given by France it would 
materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension 
here. On the other hand, if there were a violation 
of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant, 
while the other respected it, it would be extremely 
difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. 
I said that we had been discussing this question at 
a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell 
him this I gave him a memorandum of it. 

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a 
promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we 
would engage to remain neutral. 

I replied that I could not say that; our hands 
were still free, and we were considering what our 
attitude should be. All I could say was that our 
attitude would be determined largely by public 
opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium 
would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. 



204 The Evidence in the Case 

I did not think that we could give a promise of 
neutrality on that condition alone. 1 

On the following day, August 2d, the German 
Minister at Brussels handed to the Belgian Foreign 
Office the following " highly confidential" docu- 
ment. After stating that "the German Govern- 
ment has received reliable information, according 
to which the French forces intend to march on the 
Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur," and after 
suggesting a "fear that Belgium, in spite of its best 
will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely 
developed French march without aid," the docu- 
ment adds: 

It is an imperative duty for the preservation of 
Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy. 
The German Government would feel keen regret 
if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility 
against herself the fact that the measures of the 
enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to 
violate Belgian territory. 2 

Some hours later, at 1.30 a.m. on August 3d, 
the German Minister aroused the Belgian Secre- 
tary General for the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
from his slumbers and, 

asked to see Baron von der Elst. He told him that 
he was instructed by his Government to inform us 

1 English White Faper, No. 123. 2 Belgian Gray Book, No. 20, 



The Case of Belgium 205 

that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that 
a patrol of French cavalry, violating international 
law, seeing that war was not declared, had crossed 
the frontier. 

The Secretary General asked Herr von Below 
where these events had taken place; in Germany, 
he was answered. Baron von der Elst observed 
that in that case he could not understand the 
object of his communication. Herr von Below said 
that these acts, contrary to international law, were 
of a nature to make one expect that other acts con- 
trary to international law would be perpetrated by 
France. ' 



As to these last communications, it should be 
noted that the German Government, neither then 
nor at any subsequent time, ever disclosed to the 
world the "reliable information/' which it claimed 
to have of the intentions of the French Govern- 
ment, and the event shows beyond a possibility of 
contradiction that at that time France was un- 
prepared to make any invasion of Belgium or even 
to defend its own north-eastern frontier. 

It should further be noted that the alleged 
aggressive acts of France, which were made the 
excuse for the invasion of Belgium, according to 
the statement of the German Ambassador himself, 
did not take place in Belgium but in Germany. 

1 Belgian Gray Paper, No. 21. 



206 The Evidence in the Case 

On August 3d, at 7 o'clock in the morning, 
Belgium served upon the German Ambassador 
at Brussels the following reply to the German 
ultimatum, which, after quoting the substance of 
the German demand, continued: 

This note caused profound and painful surprise 
to the King's Government. 

The intentions which it attributed to France 
are in contradiction with the express declarations 
which were made to us on the 1st August in the 
name of the Government of the Republic. 

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a 
violation of Belgian neutrality were to be com- 
mitted by France, Belgium would fulfill all her 
international duties, and her army would offer the 
most vigorous opposition to the invader. 

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties 
of 1870, establish the independence and the neu- 
trality of Belgium under the guarantee of the 
Powers, and particularly of the Government of His 
Majesty the King of Prussia. 

Belgium has always been faithful to her inter- 
national obligations; she has fulfilled her duties 
in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected 
no effort to maintain her neutrality or to make it 
respected. 

The attempt against her independence, with which 
the German Government threatens her, would 
constitute a flagrant violation of international law. 
No strategic interest justifies the violation of that 
law. 



The Case of Belgium 207 

The Belgian Government would, by accepting the 
propositions which are notified to her, sacrifice the 
honor of the nation while at the same time betraying 
her duties toward Europe. 

Conscious of the part Belgium has played for 
more than eighty years in the civilization of the 
world, she refuses to believe that her independence 
can be preserved only at the expense of the viola- 
tion of her neutrality. 

If this hope were disappointed the Belgian 
Government has firmly resolved to repulse by 
every means in her power any attack upon her 
rights. 

In the records of diplomacy there are few 
nobler documents than this. Belgium then knew 
that she was facing possible annihilation. Every 
material interest suggested acquiescence in the 
peremptory demands of her powerful neighbor. 
In the belief that then so generally prevailed, and 
which recent events have somewhat modified, the 
success of Germany seemed probable, and if so, 
Belgium, by facilitating the triumph of Germany, 
would be in a position to participate in the spoils 
of the victory. 

If Belgium had regarded her honor as lightly as 
Germany and felt that the matter of self-preser- 
vation would excuse any moral dereliction, she 
would have imitated the example of Luxemburg, 
also invaded, and permitted free passage to the 



208 The Evidence in the Case 

German army without material loss of her material 
prosperity, but with a fatal sacrifice to her national 
honor. 

Even under these conditions Belgium evidently 
entertained a hope that Germany at the last 
moment would not, in view of its promises and the 
protest of Belgium, commit this foul outrage. 

The military attache of the French Government, 
being apprised of Germany's virtual declaration 
of war, offered "the support of five French army 
corps to the Belgian Government, " and in reply 
Belgium, still jealously regardful of her obliga- 
tion of neutrality, replied : 

We are sincerely grateful to the French Govern- 
ment for offering eventual support. In the actual 
circumstances, however, we do not propose to 
appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. The B elgian 
Government will decide later on the action which 
they think it necessary to take. 

As in Caesar's time, the Belgae, of all the tribes 
of Gaul, are in truth "the bravest." 

Later in the evening, the King of Belgium met 
his Ministers, and the offer of France was com- 
municated to them, and again the Belgian Govern- 
ment, still reposing some confidence in the Punic 
faith of Prussia, decided not to appeal to the 



The Case of Belgium 209 

guaranteeing Powers, or to avail itself of the offers 
of France. 

On the following morning at 6 o'clock the 
German Minister handed this formal declaration of 
war to the Belgian Government: 

I have been instructed, and have the honor to 
inform your Excellency, that in consequence of the 
Government of His Majesty the King having de- 
clined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to 
them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, 
deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out — 
if necessary by force of arms — the measures of 
security which have been set forth as indispensable 
in view of the French menaces. 

Here again, no active violation of Belgium's 
neutrality by France is alleged, only " French 
menaces." 

The conjecture is plausible that in the case of 
the Prussian General Staff, it was their "own hard 
dealings" which thus taught them to "suspect 
the thoughts of others. " 

On that day the German troops crossed the 
Belgian frontier and hostilities began. 

On the same day, at the great session of the 
Reichstag, when the Imperial Chancellor at- 
tempted to justify to the world the hostile acts of 
Germany, and especially the invasion of Belgium, 



210 The Evidence in the Case 

the pretended defense was thus bluntly stated by 
the German Premier: 

We are now in a state of necessity and necessity 
knows no law. Our troups have occupied Luxem- 
burg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. 
Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of inter- 
national law. It is true that the French Govern- 
ment has declared at Brussels that France is willing 
to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as 
her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that 
France stood ready for invasion. France could 
wait, but we could not wait. A French movement 
upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have 
been disastrous. So we were compelled to override 
the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian 
Governments. The wrong — I speak openly — that 
we are committing we will endeavor to make good as 
soon as our military goal has been reached. Any- 
body who is threatened, as we are threatened, and is 
fighting for his highest possessions, can only have 
one thought — how he is to hack his way through. 

It will be noted that on this occasion, when 
above all other occasions it was not only the duty, 
but to the highest interests of Germany, to give 
to the world any substantial reason for violating 
the neutrality of Belgium, that the defense of 
Germany is rested upon the ground of self-interest, 
— euphemistically called "necessity," — and upon 
none other. 



The Case of Belgium 211 

While Von Bethmann-Hollweg's statement 
does state that "France held herself in readiness to 
invade Belgium," there was no intimation that 
France had done so, or had any immediate inten- 
tion of doing so. On the contrary, it was added, 
"France could wait, we {Germany) could not." If 
Belgium had forfeited its rights by undue favors 
to France or England, why did the Chancellor char- 
acterize its protest as "just"? 

How Germany fulfilled the promise of its 
Chancellor, to "make good" the admitted wrong 
which it did Belgium, subsequent events have 
shown. 

It may be questioned whether, since the Thirty 
Years' War, any country has been subjected to 
such general devastating horrors. So little effort 
has been taken by the conqueror to lessen the 
inevitable suffering, that fines have been levied 
upon this impoverished people, which would be 
oppressive even in a period of prosperity. It 
is announced from Holland, as this book goes to 
press, that Germany has imposed upon this war- 
desolated country a fine of $7,000,000 per month 
and an especial fine of $75,000,000, for its 
"violation of neutrality." 

Were this episode not a tragedy, the sardonk 
humor, which caused the German General Staff 



212 The Evidence in the Case 

to impose this monstrous fine upon Belgium for 
its " violation of neutrality," would have the 
tragi-comical aspects of Bedlam. It recalls the 
fable of the wolf who complained that the lamb 
was muddying the stream and when the lamb 
politely called the wolf's attention to the fact 
that it stood lower down on the river side than the 
wolf, the latter announced its intention to devour 
the lamb in any event. Such is probably the 
intention of Prussia. If it prevail Belgium as 
an independent State will cease to exist and 
it will be mourned as Poland is. Like Poland, it 
may have a resurrection. 

The war having thus commenced between 
Germany and Belgium, the brave ruler of the 
latter country — "every inch a King" — addressed 
to the King of England the following appeal : 

Remembering the numerous proofs of your 
Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, 
and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and 
the proof of friendship you have just given us again, 
I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic inter- 
vention of your Majesty's Government to safe- 
guard the integrity of Belgium. 1 

In reply to that appeal, which no chivalrous 
nation could have disregarded, Sir Edward Grey 

1 Belgian Gray Paper, No. 25. 



The Case of Belgium 213 

immediately, on August 4th, advised the British 
Ambassador in Berlin as follows : 

We hear that Germany has addressed a note to 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that 
German Government will be compelled to carry 
out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures 
considered indispensable. 

We are also informed that Belgian territory has 
been violated at Gemmenich. 

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact 
that Germany declined to give the same assurance 
respecting Belgium as France gave last week in 
reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin 
and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask 
that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of 
this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. 
If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, 
and to say that his Majesty's Government feel 
bound to take all steps in their power to uphold 
the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a 
treaty to which Germany is as much a party as 
ourselves. 1 

Thereupon Sir Edward Goschen, the British 
Ambassador in Berlin, called upon the Secretary of 
State and stated in the name of His Majesty's 
Government that unless the Imperial Government 

could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night 
that they would proceed no further with their 

1 English White Paper, No. 159. 



214 The Evidence in the Case 

violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their 
advance, I had been instructed to demand my pass- 
ports and inform the Imperial Government that His 
Majesty's Government would have to take all 
steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of 
Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which 
Germany was as much a party as themselves. 

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret 
he could give no other answer than that which he 
had given me earlier in the day, namely, that 
the safety of the Empire rendered it absolute- 
ly necessary that the Imperial troops should ad- 
vance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency 
a written summary of your telegram and, pointing 
out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time 
when His Majesty's Government would expect an 
answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible 
consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were 
not possible even at the last moment that their 
answer should be reconsidered. He replied that 
if the time given were even twenty-four hours or 
more, his answer must be the same. I said that 
in that case I should have to demand my passports. 
This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. . . . 

I then said that I should like to go and see the 
Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I 
should have an opportunity of seeing him. He 
begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very 
agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, 
which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said 
that the step taken by His Majesty's Government 
was terrible to a degree; just for a word — "neutra- 
lity," a word which in war time had so often been 
disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain 



The Case of Belgium 215 

was going to make war on a kindred nation who de- 
sired nothing better than to be friends with her. All 
his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless 
by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, 
as I knew, he had devoted himself since his acces- 
sion to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. 
What we had done was unthinkable; it was like 
striking a man from behind while he was fighting 
for his life against two assailants. He held Great 
Britain responsible for all the terrible events that 
might happen. I protested strongly against that 
statement, and said that, in the same way as he and 
Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for 
strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death 
to Germany to advance through Belgium and vio- 
late the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to 
understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of u life 
and death" for the honor of Great Britain that she 
should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost 
to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That 
solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what 
confidence could any one have in engagements 
given by Great Britain in the future? The 
Chancellor said, "But at what price will that com- 
pact have been kept. Has the British Government 
thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as 
plainly as I could that fear of consequences could 
hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn 
engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so 
evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so 
little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from 
adding fuel to the flame by further argument. ....." 

1 British White Paper, No. 160. 



216 The Evidence in the Case 

Here again it is most significant, in view of the 
subsequent clumsily framed defense of German 
apologists, to note that the German Secretary of 
State, Herr von Jagow, and his superior, the Ger- 
man Chancellor, did not pretend to suggest that 
the invasion of Belgium was due to any overt act 
of France. 

With even greater frankness Von Jagow stated 
the real purpose, which was, "to advance into 
France by the quickest and easiest way," and to 
"avoid the more Southern route," which, "in 
view of the paucity of roads and the strength of 
the fortresses," would have entailed "great loss 
of time." 

The damning conclusion as to the guilt of Ger- 
many, which irresistibly follows from these ad- 
mitted facts, is sought to be overborne by a 
pamphlet entitled " The Truth about Germany" and 
subscribed to by a number of distinguished Ger- 
mans, who are in turn vouched for in America by 
Professor John W. Burgess of Columbia College. 
He tells us that they are the "salt of the earth," 
and "among the greatest thinkers, moralists, 
and philanthropists of the age." To over- 
bear the doubter with the weight of such 
authority we are told that this defense has the 
support of the great theologian, Harnack, the 



The Case of Belgium 217 

sound and accomplished political scientist and 
economist, Von Schmoller, the distinguished philo- 
logian, Von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian, 
Lamprecht, the profound statesman, Von Posadow- 
sky, the brilliant diplomatist, Von Bulow, the 
great financier, Von G winner, the great promoter of 
trade and commerce, Ballin, the great inventor, 
Siemens, the brilliant preacher of the Gospel, 
Dryander, and the indispensable Director in the 
Ministry of Education, Schmidt. (The adjectives 
are those of Professor Burgess.) 

The average American, as indeed the average 
citizen of any country, when his natural passions 
are not unduly aroused, is apt to take a very 
prosaic and dispassionate view of such matters, 
and when he has reached his conclusion based 
upon everyday, commonplace morality, he is not 
apt to be shaken even by an imposing array 
of names, fortified by an enthusiastic excess of 
grandiloquent adjectives. The aristocracy of 
brains has no monopoly of truth, which is often 
best grasped by the democracy of common sense. 

The defense of these notable representatives 
of German thought seems to be based upon the 
wholly unsupported assertion that "England and 
France were resolved not to respect the neutrality 
of Belgium." 



218 The Evidence in the Case 

They say: 

It would have been a crime against the German 
people if the German General Staff had not antici- 
pated this intention. The inalienable right of 
self-defense gives the individual, whose very exist- 
ence is at stake, the moral liberty to resort to 
weapons which would be forbidden except in times 
of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not 
acquiesce in a friendly neutrality, which would 
permit the unobstructed passage of German troops 
through small portions of her territory, although 
her integrity was guaranteed, the German General 
Staff was obliged to force the passage in order to 
avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the 
most unfavorable ground. 

In other words, it seemed preferable to the 
German General Staff that it should fight in 
France rather than in Germany, and for this 
reason Belgium must be ruined. 

Notwithstanding this and similar propositions, 
which are so abhorrent in their political immorality, 
it is yet gravely suggested by Dr. Dernberg and 
others that Bernhardi's philosophy does not reflect 
the true thought of the Prussian ruling classes. 
Here are representative theologians, economists, 
historians, statesmen, diplomatists, financiers, in- 
ventors, and educators, who, in invoking the sup- 
port of the educated classes in the United States, 



The Case of Belgium 219 

deliberately subscribe to a proposition at which 
even Machiavelli might have gagged. 

We are further told that "the German troops, 
with their iron discipline will respect the personal 
property and liberty of the individual in Belgium 
just as they did in France in 1870," and these 
scientists, philosophers, and doctors of divinity 
add that "Belgium would have been wise, if it 
had permitted the passage of the German troops," 
for the Belgian people "would have fared well from 
the business point of view, for the army would have 
proved a good customer and paid well. " 

To this defense we are led in the last analy- 
sis, that Belgium should have preferred cash 
to her honor, just as the German General Staff 
preferred dishonor to the sacrifice of an immediate 
military advantage. 

The possibilities of moral casuistry have been 
severely tested in the attempt of these apologists 
for Germany to defend the forcible invasion of 
Belgium. 

The ethical question has been made quite un- 
necessarily to pivot upon the express contractual 
obligations of England, Germany, and France 
with respect to the neutrality of Belgium. The 
indictment of Germany has been placed upon the 
sound but too narrow ground that by the Treaty 



220 The Evidence in the Case 

of 1839, and The Hague Convention of 1907, 
Germany had obligated itself by a solemn pledge 
to respect the neutrality both of Luxemburg and 
Belgium. 

If, however, there had been no Hague Conven- 
tion and no Treaty of 1839, an d if Germany, 
England, and France had never entered into re- 
ciprocal obligations in the event of war to respect 
Belgium's neutrality, nevertheless upon the broad- 
est considerations of international law the invasion 
without its consent would be without any justifica- 
tion whatever. 

It is a fundamental axiom of international law 
that each nation is the sole and exclusive judge 
of the conditions under which it will permit an 
alien to cross its frontiers. Its territory is sacro- 
sanct. No nation can invade the territory of 
another without its consent. To do so by com- 
pulsion is an act of war. Each nation's land is its 
castle of asylum and defense. This fundamental 
right of Belgium should not be confused or ob- 
scured by balancing the subordinate equities be- 
tween France, Germany, and England with respect 
to their formal treaty obligations. 

Belgium's case has thus been weakened in the 
forum of public opinion by too insistent reference 
to the special treaties. The right of Belgium and 



The Case of Belgium 221 

of its citizens as individuals, to be secure in their 
possessions rests upon the sure foundation of 
inalienable right and is guarded by the immutable 
principle of moral law, "Thou shalt not steal." 
It was well said by Alexander Hamilton : 

The sacred rights of man are not to be searched 
for in old parchments and musty records ; they are 
written as with a sunbeam in the whole volume of 
human nature by the hand of Divinity itself and 
can never be erased by mortal power. 

This truth can be illustrated by an imaginary 
instance. Let us suppose that the armies of the 
Kaiser had made the progress which they so 
confidently anticipated, and had not simply cap- 
tured Paris, but had also invaded England, and 
that, in an attempt to crush the British Empire, 
the German General Staff planned an inva- 
sion of Canada. Let us further suppose that 
Germany thereupon served upon the United States 
such an arrogant demand as it made upon Bel- 
gium, requiring the United States to permit it to 
land an army in New York, with the accompany- 
ing assurance that neither its territory nor in- 
dependence would be injured, and that Germany 
would generously reimburse it for any damage. 

Let us further suppose — and it is not a very 
fanciful supposition— that the United States 



222 The Evidence in the Case 

would reply to the German demand that under no 
circumstances should a German force be landed in 
New York or its territory be used as a base of 
hostile operations against Canada. To carry out 
the analogy in all its details, let us then suppose 
that the German fleet should land an army in the 
city of New York, arrest its Mayor, and check 
the first attempt of its outraged inhabitants to 
defend the city by demolishing the Cathedral, the 
Metropolitan Art Gallery, the City Hall and other 
structures, and shooting down remorselessly large 
numbers of citizens, because a few non-com- 
batants had not accepted the invasion with due 
humility. 

Although Germany had not entered into any 
treaty to respect the territory of the United 
States, no one would seriously contend that Ger- 
many would be justified in such an invasion. 

The alleged invalidation of the treaty of 1839 
being thus unimportant, Dr. Dernburg and Pro- 
fessor von Mach fall back upon the only remain- 
ing defense, that France had already violated the 
neutrality of Belgium with the latter's consent. 
Of this there is no evidence whatever. We have, on 
the contrary, the express assurance, which France 
gave on the eve of the German invasion both 
to Belgium and England, that it would not violate 



The Case of Belgium 223 

the rights of Belgium, and in addition we have 
the significant fact that when Belgium was 
invaded, and it was vitally necessary that the 
French Army should go with all possible speed 
to its relief and thus stop the invasion and 
save France itself from invasion, it was ten days 
before France could send any adequate support. 
Unhappily it was then too late. 

If it were true that France intended to invade 
Belgium, then of all the blunders that the German 
Foreign Office has made, the greatest was that it 
did not permit France to carry out this step, for 
it would have palliated the action of Germany in 
meeting such violation by a similar invasion, and 
it would thus have been an immeasurable gain for 
Germany and a greater injury to France. 

Germany's greatest weakness to-day is its 
moral isolation. It stands condemned by the 
judgment of the civilized world. No physical 
power it can exercise can compensate for this loss 
of moral power. Even success will be too dearly 
bought at such a price. There are things which 
succeed better than success. Truth is one of them. 

Under the plea of necessity, which means Ger- 
many's desire to minimize its losses of life, Germany 
has turned Belgium into a shambles, trampled 
a peaceful nation under foot and almost crushed its 



224 The Evidence in the Case 

soul beneath the iron tread of its mighty armies. 

Almost wounded unto death, and for a time 
prostrate under the heel of the conqueror, 
the honor of Belgium shines unsullied by any 
selfish interests, personal dishonor, or lack of 
courage. 

It is claimed that there were officers of the French 
Army in Liege and Namur before the war broke 
out. Neither names nor dates have been given, 
and the allegation might be fairly dismissed be- 
cause of the very vagueness of the charge. But 
even if it were true, international law does not 
forbid the officers of one nation serving with the 
armies of another. German officers have for many 
years been thus employed in Turkey and engaged 
in training and developing the Turkish Army, but 
no one has ever contended that the employment 
by that country of German military officers was 
a violation of neutrality, or gave rise to a casus 
belli. 

It is wholly probable that there were some 
German officers in Belgium before the war com- 
menced, and if not, there were certainly hundreds 
of spies, of whose pernicious activities the Belgian 
people were to learn later to their infinite sorrow, 
but because Germany employed an elaborate 
system of espionage in Belgium, it could not 



The Case of Belgium 225 

justify France in invading its territory without its 
permission. 

To a lawyer, who has had experience in the 
judicial ascertainment of truth, there is one con- 
sideration that justifies him in disposing of all these 
vague allegations with respect to French activities 
m Belgium on the eve of the war, and that is that 
Germany has not only failed to give any testimony 
in support of the charges, but it never suggested this 
defense until the judgment of the civilized world 
had branded it with an ineffaceable stain. 

Professor von Mach, a former educator of Har- 
vard University and an apologist for Germany, 
feels this poverty of evidence and has rather 
naively suggested an adjournment of the case. He 
says: 

Did French officers remain in Liege or in any 
other Belgian fortress after hostilities had begun, 
and did France plan to go through Belgium? Ger- 
many has officially made both claims. The first 
can easily be substantiated by The Supreme Court 
of Civilization by an investigation of the prisoners 
of war taken in Belgium. Until an impartial 
investigation becomes possible no further proof 
than the claim made by the German Government 
can be produced. 

As the French officers taken in Belgium are 
presumably in German detention camps, it would 



226 The Evidence in the Case 

seem that Germany should first substantiate its 
defense by names, dates, and places, although even 
then the mere capture of French officers in Bel- 
gium after the invasion had begun does not 
necessarily indicate that they were in Belgium 
before the invasion. 

Dr. von Mach adds in the reply, which he made 
in the New York Times to an article contributed 
by the writer to that journal : 

It is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs 
are which Germany possesses, and which for military 
reasons it has not yet been able to divulge. . . . This 
is an important question, and the answer must be 
left to The Supreme Court of Civilization. The 
weight of the evidence would seem to point to a 
justification of Germany. Yet no friend of Ger- 
many can find fault with those who would wish to 
defer a verdict until such time when Germany can 
present her complete proof to the world, and this 
may be when the war is over. 

This naive suggestion, that the vital question of 
fact should be postponed, and in the meantime 
judgment should be entered for Germany, is 
refreshing in its novelty. Its only parallel was 
the contention of the celebrated Dr. Cook, who 
contended that the world should accept his claim 
as to the discovery of the North Pole and await 
the proofs later. 



The Case of Belgium 227 

Professor von Mach, in his book, " What Germany 
Wants" further explains this dilatory defense and 
amplifies it in a manner that is certainly unusual 
in an historian. He recognizes that the speech of 
the German Chancellor in the Reichstag on August 
4th, in which Von Bethmann-Hollweg admitted 
that the action of Germany in invading Belgium 
was wrong and only justified it on the ground of 
self-preservation, was a virtual plea of guilty by 
Prussia of the crime, of which it stands indicted 
at the bar of the civilized world. 

Germany's scholarly apologist, as amicus curia, 
then suggests that in criminal procedure, when 
a defendant pleads guilty, the Court often re- 
fuses to accept his plea, enters a plea of not guilty 
for him, and assigns counsel to defend the case. 
He therefore suggests that the Chancellor's plea 
of guilty should be disregarded and the Court 
should assign counsel. 

One difficulty with the analogy is that courts 
do not ordinarily refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty. On the contrary, they accept it almost 
invariably, for why try the guilt of a man when he 
himself in the most formal way acknowledges it? 

The only instance in which a court does show 
such consideration to a prisoner is when the de- 
fendant is both poor and ignorant. Then, and 



228 The Evidence in the Case 

only then, with a fine regard for human right, is 
the procedure suggested by Prof, von Mach 
followed. 

To this humiliating position, Professor von 
Mach as amicus curice consigns his great nation. 
For myself, as one who admires Germany and be- 
lieves it to be much greater and truer than its 
ruling caste or its over-zealous apologists, I refuse 
to accept the justification of such an absurd and 
degrading analogy. 

The blunt acknowledgment of the German 
Chancellor in the Reichstag, already quoted, is 
infinitely preferable to the disingenuous defenses 
of Germany's ardent but sophistical apologists. 
Fully recognizing the import of his words, Von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, addressing the representa- 
tives of the German nation, put aside with admir- 
able candor all these sophistical artifices and 
rested the defense of Germany upon the single 
contention that Germany was beset by powerful 
enemies and that it was a matter of necessity for 
her to perpetrate this " wrong" and in this manner 
to "hack her way through." 

This defense is not even a plea of confession and 
avoidance. It is a plea of "Guilty" at the bar of 
the world. It has one merit. It does not add to 
the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy. 



The Case of Belgium 229 

After the civilized world had condemned the 
invasion of Belgium with an unprecedented ap- 
proach to unanimity, the German Chancellor 
rather tardily discovered that public opinion was 
still a vital force in the world and that the strategic 
results of the occupation of Belgium had not 
compensated for the moral injury. For this reason 
he framed five months after this crime against 
civilization a belated defense, which proved so 
unconvincing that the Bernhardi plea of military 
necessity is clearly preferable, as at least having 
the merit of candor. 

After proclaiming to the world that the German 
Foreign Office had discovered in Brussels certain 
secret documents, which disclosed the fact that 
the neutrality of Belgium at the time of the in- 
vasion was a sham and after the civilized world had 
refused to accept this bald and unsupported 
assertion, as it had also refused to accent the 
spurious evidence of a well-known Arctic explorer, 
the German Foreign Office in December, 19 14 
published its alleged proofs. 

The first purported to be a report of the Chief 
of the Belgian General Staff to the Minister of 
War and reported his conversations in 1906 with 
a military attache of the British Legation in 
Brussels. 

J 3 



230 The Evidence in the Case 

The second purported to be a report of similar 
conversations in 1912 between the same officials. 

In an authorized statement, published on Janu- 
ary 27, 191 5, Sir Edward Grey states that there 
is no record of either of these negotiations in the 
English Foreign Office or the War Office; but this 
fact is not in itself conclusive and as there is no 
evidence that the documents were forged, their 
genuineness should be assumed in the absence of 
some more specific denial. 

The documents, however, do not appreciably 
advance the cause of Germany, for they disclose 
on their face that the conversations were not 
binding on the Governments of England or Bel- 
gium but were simply an informal exchange of 
view between the officials, and what is far more to 
the purpose, the whole of the first conversation of 
April 10, 1906, was expressly based upon the 
statement that "the entry of the English into 
Belgium would take place only after the violation of 
our neutrality by Germany. " 

The second document also shows that the Bel- 
gian Chief of Staff expressly stated that any in- 
vasion of Belgium by England, made to repel a 
prior German invasion, could not take place with- 
out the express consent of Belgium, to be given 
when the occasion arose, and it is further evident 



The Case of Belgium 231 

that the statement of the English military attache 
— clearly a subordinate official to define the foreign 
policy of a great Empire — expressly predicated his 
assumption, that England might disembark troops 
in Belgium, upon the statement that its object 
would be to repel a German invasion of Belgian 
territory. 

If it be asked why England and Belgium were 
thus in 1906 and 191 2 considering the contingency 
of a German invasion of Belgium and the method 
of effectually repelling it, the reply is obvious that 
such invasion, in the event of a war between Ger- 
many and France, was a commonplace of German 
military strategists. Of this purpose they made 
little, if any, concealment. The construction by 
Germany of numerous strategic railway lines on 
the Belgian frontier, which were out of proportion 
to the economic necessity of the territory, gave to 
Europe some indication of Germany's purpose and 
there could have been little doubt as to such 
intention, if Germany had not, through its Foreign 
Office, given, as previously shown, repeated and 
continuous assurances to Belgium that such was 
not its intention. 

The German Chancellor — whose stupendous 
blunders of speech and action in this crisis will be 
the marvel of posterity — has further attempted to 



232' The Evidence in the Case 

correct his record by two equally disingenuous 
defenses. Speaking to the Reichstag on December 
2, 1914, he said: 

When on the 4th of August I referred to the 
wrong which we were doing in marching through 
Belgium, it was not yet known for certain whether 
the Brussels Government in the hour of need would 
not decide after all to spare the country and to 
retire to Antwerp under protest. You remember 
that, after the occupation of Liege, at the request of 
our army leaders I repeated the offer to the Belgian 
Government. For military reasons it was absolute- 
ly imperative that at the time, about the 4th of 
August, the possibility for such a development 
should be kept open. Even then the guilt of the 
Belgian Government was apparent from many a sign, 
although I had not yet any positive documentary 
proofs at my disposal. 

This is much too vague to excuse a great crime. 
The guilt of Belgium is said to be " apparent from 
many a sign, " but what these signs are the Chan- 
cellor still fails to state. He admits that they were 
not documentary in character. If the guilt of 
Belgium had been so apparent to the Chancellor 
on August the 4th, when he made his confession of 
wrong doing in the Reichstag, then it is incredible 
that he would have made such an admission. 

As to the overt acts of France, all that the Chan- 
cellor said in his speech of December 2 was "that 



The Case of Belgium 233 

France's plan of campaign was known to us and 
that it compelled us for reasons of self-preserva- 
tion to march through Belgium. ,, But it is again 
significant that, speaking nearly five months after 
his first public utterance on the subject and with a 
full knowledge that the world had visited its 
destructive condemnation upon Germany for its 
wanton attack upon Belgium, the Chancellor can 
still give no specific allegation of any overt act by 
France which justified the invasion. All that is 
suggested is a supposed "plan of campaign. " 

Following this unconvincing and plainly disin- 
genuous speech, the Chancellor proceeded in an 
authorized newspaper interview on January 25, 
19 1 5 to state that his now famous — or infamous 
— remark about "the scrap of paper" had been 
misunderstood. 

After stating that he felt a painful "surprise to 
learn that my phrase, 'a scrap of paper,' should 
have caused such an unfavorable impression on 
the United States," he proceeds to explain that 
in his now historic interview with the British 
Ambassador, 

he (von Bethmann-Hollweg) had spoken of the 
treaty not as a ''scrap of paper" for Germany, but 
as an instrument which had become obsolete through 
Belgium's forfeiture of its neutrality and that Great 



234 The Evidence in the Case 

Britain had quite other reasons for entering into the 
war, compared with which the neutrality treaty- 
appeared to have only the value of a scrap of paper. 

Let the reader here pause to note the twofold 
character of this defense. 

It suggests that Germany's guaranty of Bel- 
gium's neutrality had become for Germany "a 
scrap of paper" because of Belgium's alleged 
forfeiture of its rights as a neutral nation, al- 
though at the time referred to the German Chan- 
cellor had not only asked the permission of Belgium 
to cross its territory but immediately before his 
interview with the British Ambassador he had 
publicly testified in his speech in the Reichstag 
to the justice of Belgium's protest. 

The other and inconsistent suggestion is that, 
without respect to Belgium's rights under the 
treaty of 1839, the violation of its territory by 
Germany was not the cause of England's interven- 
tion ; but obviously this hardly explains the German 
Chancellor's contemptuous reference to the long 
standing and oft repeated guaranty of Belgium's 
neutrality as merely a "scrap of paper. " 

Having thus somewhat vaguely suggested a 
twofold defense, the Chancellor, without impeach- 
ing the accuracy of Goschen's report of the inter- 
view, then proceeded to state that the conversation 



The Case of Belgium 235 

in question took place immediately after his 
speech in the Reichstag, in which, as stated, 
he had admitted the justice of Belgium's protest 
against the violation of its territory, and he adds 
that, 



when I spoke, I already had certain indications but 
no absolute proof upon which to base a public ac- 
cusation that Belgium long before had abandoned 
its neutrality in its relations with England. Never- 
theless I took Germany's responsibilities toward the 
neutral States so seriously that I spoke frankly of 
the wrong committed by Germany. 



If the German Chancellor is truthful in his state- 
ment that on August the 4th, when he spoke in 
the Reichstag and an hour later had his conversa- 
tion with Goschen, he had " certain indications" 
that Belgium had forfeited its rights as an indepen- 
dent nation by hostile acts, then the German Chan- 
cellor took such a serious view of " Germany's 
responsibilities" that, without any necessity or 
justification, he indicted his country at the bar of 
the whole world with a flagrant wrong. If he 
could not at that time justify the act of the 
German General Staff, he should at least have 
been silent, but, according to his incredible state- 
ment, although he had these "certain indications" 



236 The Evidence in the Case 

and thus knew that Germany, in invading Belgium, 
was simply attacking an already hostile country, 
he deliberately explains, not only to his nation 
but to the whole world, that such invasion was a 
wrong and had no justification in international 
law. How can any reasonable man, whose eyes 
are not blinded with the passions of the hour, 
accept this explanation? 

It is even more remarkable that immediately 
following the session of the Reichstag, when he 
had his interview with Goschen, the German 
Chancellor never suggested in his own defense or 
that of his country, that he had "certain indica- 
tions," which justified the action that day taken, 
although he then knew that, unless he could justify 
it, England would immediately join the already 
powerful foes of Germany. 

The reader need only reread Goschen 's report 
of that interview {ante, p. 214) to know how dis- 
ingenuous this belated explanation is. With the 
whole world ringing with the infamous phrase, the 
German Chancellor, after five months of reflection, 
can only make this pitiful defense. Its acceptance 
subjects even the most credulous to a severe strain. 
It exhausts the limit of gullibility. 

The defense wholly ignores the fact that the 
Chancellor had previously sought to bribe Eng- 



The Case of Belgium 237 

land to condone in advance the invasion of Bel- 
gium by Germany, and that Germany had also 
coerced Luxemburg into a passive acquiescence in a 
similar invasion, and there is as yet no pretense 
that Luxemburg had failed in its obligation of 
neutrality. 

Should the judgment of the civilized world 
turn from the terrible fate of Belgium and con- 
sider the wrong that was done to Luxemburg, 
then the German Chancellor may, unless better 
advised, frame further maladroit excuses with 
reference to that country. 

All these explanations, as senseless as they are 
false, and savoring more of the tone of a crim- 
inal court then that of an imperial chancellery, 
should shock those who admire historic Germany. 
They are unworthy of so great a nation. Bis- 
marck would never have stooped to such pitiful 
and transparent deception. The blunt candor of 
Maximilian Harden, which we have already 
quoted on page 12, is infinitely preferable and the 
position of Germany at the bar of the civilized 
world will improve, when its maladroit Chancellor 
has the courage and the candor to say, as Harden 
did, that all this was done because Germany 
regarded it as for its vital interests and because 
"we willed it." 



238 The Evidence in the Case 

Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest 
veneering of barbarism ; unless the law of the world 
is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and the con- 
science of the cannon; unless mankind, after 
uncounted centuries, has made no real advance in 
political morality beyond that of the cave dweller, 
then this answer of Germany cannot satisfy the 
"decent respect to the opinions of mankind." 
It is the negation of all that civilization stands for. 

Belgium has been crucified in the face of the 
world. Its innocence of any offense, until it was 
attacked, is too clear for argument. Its voluntary 
immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of 
neutrality will "plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, 
against the deep damnation of its taking off." 

It may be questioned whether, since the fall of 
Poland, Civilization has been stirred to more pro- 
found pity and intense indignation than by this 
wanton outrage. Pity, radiating to the utmost 
corners of the world by the "sightless couriers of 
the air, " 

"Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye 
That tears shall drown the wind." 

Was it also, as with Macbeth, a case of 

" Vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself 
And falls on the other" ? 



The Case of Belgium 239 

Time will tell. 

Had Germany not invaded Belgium, it is an even 
chance that England would not have intervened, 
at least at the beginning of the war. 

Germany could have detached a relatively 
small part of its army to defend its highly fortified 
Western frontier, and leaving France to waste its 
strength on frontal attacks on that almost im- 
pregnable line of defense, Germany with the bulk of 
its army and that of Austria could have made a 
swift drive at Russia. 

Is it not possible that that course would have 
yielded better results than the fiasco, which 
followed the fruitless drive at Paris? 

If Germany succeeds, it will claim that "noth- 
ing succeeds like success," and to the disciples of 
Treitschke and Bernhardi this will be a sufficing 
answer. 

If it fail, posterity will be at a loss to determine 
which blundered the worst, the German Foreign 
Office or its General Staff, its diplomats or its 
generals. 



"A very remarkable presentation of the case." 

London Spectator. 

The Evidence in the Case 

By 

James M. Beck 

With an Introduction by 

Hon. Joseph H. Choate 

Former Ambassador to Great Britain 

6th Printing. Revised Edition with Additional Material 
12°. 293 pages. $1 .00 net. {Postage extra) 

Mr. Beck has taken the diplomatic testimony in one 
of the greatest controversies in history and, treating the 
European rulers, statesmen, and diplomats as witnesses at 
the bar of justice, he has given to his scholarly discussion 
of the moral issues of the present war the fascinating in- 
terest of a powerful drama or absorbing novel. 

" Mr. Beck's book is so extremely interesting from 
beginning to end that it is difficult, when once begun, to 
lay it down and break off the reading." — Joseph H. 
Choate's Introduction. 

" A remarkable work, written in a spirit of justice and 
impartiality." — Paris Gaulois. "A singularly acute 
and liberal commentary." — The London Times. " No 
more trenchant exposure of German diplomacy." — 
Edinburgh Scotsman. " A remarkable combination of 
shrewd good sense and fine idealism." — New York 
Evening Post. " Mr. Beck writes with the logical pre- 
cision of a lawyer and with a lofty eloquence and a fire 
of moral indignation that lawyers too often lack." — 
London Chronicle. 



New York ©. P. Putnam's Sons London 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

015 910 654 8 



A Selection from a List of 

War Books 

France Herself Again Alsace and Lorraine 



By Ernest Dimnet 

The well-known historian, Abbe 
Ernest Dimnet, draws a compari- 
son between the demoralized 
France of 1870 and the United 
France of to-day. 

$2.50 

Why Europe Is at War 

The Question Considered from the 
Points of View of France, Eng- 
land, Germany, Japan, and the 
United States. 

By Frederic R. Coudert, Frederick 
Wo Whitridge, Edmond von 
Mach, F. Ineyaga, Francis 
Vinton Greene. 
With Portraits, 12°. $1.00 

The Origins of the 
WaT~ 

By J. Holland Rose, Litt.D. 

Author of " The Personality of 
Napoleon," etc. 
In this volume the author traces 
the course of the political develop- 
ments out of which the present 
war has arisen, the subject being 
treated under the following head- 
ings : 

" Anglo-German Rivalry (1 875- 
1888)," "The Kaiser," "Ger- 
many's World Policy," " Morocco: 
The Bagdad Railway," "The 
Eastern Question (J908-J9J3)," 
"The Crisis of 1914," "The 
Rupture." 

12°. $1.00 



From Caesar to Kaiser. 50 B.C.— 
J87J A.D. 

A sketch of the political affilia- 
tions of the provinces before the 
creation of the Reichsland of 
Elsass-Lothringen, 

By Ruth Putnam 

Author of " William the Silent," 

"Charles the Bold," etc. 
With Eight Maps. 12°. $125 

Treitschke 

The Writings of Bernhardi's 
Teacher, Heinrich von Treitschke, 
Together with a Life, by His 
Close Friend, Adolf Hausrath. 

Lord Acton says of Treitschke: 
" He is the one writer of history 
who is more brilliant and more 
powerful than Droysen; and he 
writes with the force and incisive- 
ness of Mommsen, but he con- 
cerns himself with the problems 
of the present day, problems that 
are still demanding solution." 

12°. $150 

Germany, France, 
Russia, and Islam 

A further series of essays by 
Treitschke, now translated into 
English for the first time. 

12°, $1.50 



NEW YORK 
2-6 W. 45th St. 



G. P. Putnam's Sons 



LONDON 
24 Bedford St. 



